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CHAPTER 8 
Labor Law 
WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR.* 
A. UNITED STATEs SuPREME CouRT DEcisioNs 
§8.1. Antitrust Exemption of Labor Unions. In ~hat was proba-
bly the most important-and certainly the most con(roversial-labor 
law decision of the Survey year, the Supreme Court in Connell Construc-
tion Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 1 used a novel basis fori depriving labor 
unions of their general exemption from the antitrust lfiws. 
In Connell, Plumbers and Steamfitters Local Union lOO, the bargain-
ing representative for workers in the plumbing and nilechanical trades 
in Dallas, Texas, was a party to a multiemployer coll¢ctive-bargaining 
agreement with a mechanical subcontractors' association. The agree-
ment contained a "most favored nation" clause, by which the union 
agreed that if it granted a more favorable contract tp any other em-
ployer, it would extend the same terms to all asso~iation members. 
The union began picketing Connell Construction Cor)lpany, a general 
building contractor which subcontracted all of it~ plumbing and 
mechanical work, and had no employees the union ~anted to repre-
sent. The object of the union's picketing was to secu~e an agreement 
that Connell would only subcontract its plumbing w@rk to firms cov-
ered by the multiemployer collective-bargaining agreement. Connell 
ultimately acceded to the union's demands, but signed the subcon-
tracting agreement under protest.2 The company suei:l for declaratory 
and injunctive relief, claiming that the agreement violated sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act3 and was thus invalid. The federal district 
court decided against Connell, holding that the subcontracting agree-
ment between the union and the company was exempt from federal 
antitrust laws because it was authorized by the construction industry 
*WILLIAM'T. SHERRY, JR. is an associate in the law firm of Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 
Boston. 
§8.1. 1 421 u.s. 616 (1975). 
2 Id. at 619-20. 
3 15 u.s.c. §§ 1, 2 (1970). 
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proviso to section 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),4 
which, on its face, exempts all construction industry "hot cargo" 
agreements from the Act's proscription of secondary boycott 
agreements. 5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 6 
The Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision reversed the decision of 
the Fifth Circuit. 7 
The majority, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Powell, held8 
that the union's agreement with Connell did not fall within the limited 
nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions recognized in Meat 
Cutters Local 189 v. Jewel Tea Co. 9 In attempting to accommodate the 
dual congressional objective favoring collective bargaining and free 
competition in the business markets, the Court concluded that the 
agreement "contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by 
congressional labor policy, and therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory 
exemption from the antitrustlaws."10 
The exact reason why the majority concluded that the agreement 
did not qualify for the nonstatutory "Jewel Tea" exemption from the 
antitrust laws is not clear from the Court's opinion. The majority 
found that the restraint imposed by the union's agreement with Con-
nell had "substantial anticompetitive effects, both actual and potential, 
that would not follow naturally from the elimination of competition 
over wages and working conditions," and therefore could not be ex-
cused by the NLRA's policy favoring standardized working 
conditions.U In support of this conclusion, Mr. Justice Powell opined, 
without further explanation, that the agreement would indiscrimi-
4 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). This section provides in part that: 
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer 
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such em-
ployer ceases or refrains or agrees ... to cease doing business with any other per-
son ... : Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement be-
tween a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating 
to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construc-
tion, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work .... 
5 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 78 L.R.R.M. 3012, 3014 (N.D. Tex. 
1971). The district court also held that federal labor law preempted the state's antitrust 
law.ld. 
6 483 F.2d 1154, 1175,84 L.R.R.M. 2001,2017 (5th Cir. 1973). 
7 421 U.S. 616, 635 (1975). . 
8 /d. at 625. 
9 381 U.S. 676 (1965). The statutory sources of a labor organization's exemption from 
federal antitrust laws are sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970) 
and 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970), and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 
113 (1970). These provisions do not exempt concerted action or agreements between 
unions and nonlabor parties. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965). ln]ewel 
Tea, however, a majority of the Court recognized that a proper accommodation be-
tween the congressional policy favoring free competition in business markets requires 
that some union agreements be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption fwn al'!ti-
trust sanctions. See 381 U.S. 'lt 689-90 (White, j.); id. at 710 (Goldberg, J.). 
10 421 U.S. at 625. 
11 /d. 
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nately exclude nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the con-
struction market, even if their competitive advantage was derived 
from efficient operation rather than substandard wages. 12 On the 
other hand, where subcontractors agreed to the union's terms, the 
majority concluded that the most favored nation claJ.Ise in the mul-
tiemployer agreement would operate to eliminate competition be-
tween members of the multiemployer association and any other sub-
contractors organized by the union, not only with r¢spect to wages, 
hours, and working conditions, but also on other subjects covered by 
the multiemployer agreementP Nonetheless, the maj.prity did not ex-
plain which areas of competition, beyond the subjects of mandatory 
bargaining, would be restrained by the nonunionizecl subcontractors' 
forced adhesion to the terms of the multiemployer agteement. 
In addition to these perceived restraints, the Court viewed with 
alarm the union's ability under the agreement with Connell unilater-
ally to exclude subcontractors from the market wher¢ such exclusion 
furthered the union's job-preservation interest. 14 In short, the opinion 
of the majority was based on a number of factors without a clear indi-
cation whether any single factor or a combination of factors deprived 
the agreement between the union and Connell of its •imtitrust exemp-
tion. 
The union also contended that, even if the agreement with Connell 
did not qualify for the nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust 
laws, it was lawful under the construction proviso . to section S(e). 
Therefore, the union argued, the contract had been specifically au-
thorized by the Congress and could not give rise to an antitrust 
violation. 15 The union further contended that if the subcontracting 
agreement were not sanctioned by the construction proviso and was 
therefore illegal under section S(e), it could not be the basis for anti-
trust liability because the remedies of the National Labor Relations 
Act were exclusive. 16 
The majority agreed with the union's contention th* the agreement 
with Connell satisfied the literal language of the first proviso to sec-
tion S(e) because the parties thereto were an employer and labor or-
ganization and because the contract applied to the subcontracting of 
work to be done at the construction site. The majority, however, rely-
ing on what is at best ambiguous legislative history, held that the 
agreement was not sanctioned by section S(e) because it was "outside 
the context of a collective-bargaining relationship and: not restricted to 
? particular jobsite."17 The Court determined that the construction 
12 Id. at 623. 
13 /d. at 623-24. 
14 /d. at 624-25. 
15 Id. at 626-27. 
16 /d. at 633-34. 
17 /d. at 635. 
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industry proviso was appended to section 8(e) in order to permit un-
ions at a construction site to exclude nonunion subcontractors 
through secondary agreements. 18 The Connell agreement, which was 
designed to serve as an organizational tool for the union, was outside 
this limited statutory purpose. 19 Moreover, the broad interpretation of 
the proviso sought by the union ran contrary to the 1959 ·amend-
ments' aim of limiting "top-down" organizing. 20 
With respect to the union's argument that the Court should find 
the National Labor Relations Act to be the exclusive remedy for illegal 
hot-cargo agreements, the Court concluded that there was no legisla-
tive history suggesting a congressional intent to displace antitrust 
remediesY On the question of preemption, the majority found that 
the use of state antitrust laws to regulate union activities created a 
substantial risk of conflict with important federal labor law policies 
such as promotion of employee organization and elimination of com-
petition based on wage differences, and therefore state antitrust laws 
were preempted.22 
Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Mar-
shall in dissent, thought there was compelling legislative history dem-
onstrating a congressional intent that the labor law remedies were ex-
clusive with respect to any injury caused by secondary union activity 
and agreements such as that present in Connell. 23 
§8.2. Veterans Rights. In Foster v. Dravo Corp., 1 the Court re-
solved an apparent conflict among the circuits2 concerning reem-
ployment rights under section 9 of the Military Selective Service Act. 3 
That section ensures a returning serviceman the right to be restored 
to his job on the same levels of seniority, status, and pay that he 
would have enjoyed if he had held the job throughout the time he 
was in the military. 4 The question presented in Foster was whether sec-
tion 9 entitled a veteran to receive full vacation benefits when, be-
cause of time spent in military service, the veteran had failed to satisfy 
the eligibility requirement of a collective-bargaining agreement that 
conditioned such benefits upon the receipt of earnings for a 
minimum of 25 weeks in each calendar year. 
Speaking through Mr. Justice Marshall, the Court noted that it has 
consistently applied the Act to assure that benefits and advancements 
18 !d. at 630. 
19 !d. at 631. 
20 !d. at 632-33. See 29 U.S.C. § 157(b)(7) (1970). 
21 421 U.S. at 634. 
22 I d. at 636. 
23 Id. at 654-55 (dissenting opinion). 
§8.2. I 420 U.S. 92 (1975). 
2 Ewert v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 477 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1973); Lacaynia v. 
American Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1972). 
3 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 459 (1968). 
4 !d. § 459(b). 
4
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that would necessarily have accrued by virtue of co~tinued employ-
ment would not be denied the veteran merely becauSie of his absence 
in the military service. 5 On the other hand, the Court found that the 
benefit might be denied where it was, in actuality, deferred short-term 
compensation for work actually performed.6 Concluding that the va-
cation provision in the collective-bargaining agreem<tnt fell into the 
latter category, the Court held that the petitioner had no statutory 
right to full vacation benefits. 7 . 
§8.3. Right of Minority Workers to Engage in S~parate Bargain-
ing. In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community 
Organization, 1 the Supreme Court held that an employer did not vio-
late the National Labor Relations Act when it discharged two minority 
workers for having engaged in a peaceful consumer b~ycott to compel 
their employer to bypass their union and bargain directly with them 
over employment practices. 2 The Court's decision ~pheld a Board 
ruling3 that the conduct of the employees was not protected by the 
Act. That decision had been reversed by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia,4 on grounds that concerted activity directed 
against racial discrimination e~oyed a unique status d¢riving from the 
federal labor policy against discrimination expressed i in Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 
The Supreme Court, with Mr. Justice Douglas the sole dissenter, re-
fused to carve out for minority employees an exceptioh from the basic 
labor law principle that a union is the exclusive representative of all 
employees within an appropriate bargaining unit. 6 The Court con-
cluded that Congress, in enacting the National Labor Relations Act, 
had sought to protect minority interests by preventing their sub-
mergence in an inappropriate bargaining unit. 7 FU.rthermore, the 
1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments8 sought "to assure that minority 
voices are heard as they are in the functioning of a democratic 
institution."9 Finally, the Court noted that the Board !has ruled that a 
union's refusal to process grievances against racial discrimination is an 
unfair labor practice. 10 
5 420 U.S. at 96-97. 
6 /d. at 99-100. 
7 Id. at 101. 
§8.3. I 420 U.S. 5Q (1975). 
2 !d. at 70. 
3 The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1971), rev'd, 485 F.2d 917, 83 
L.R.R.M. 2738 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
4 Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917,. 83 L.R.R.M. 2738 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). ! 
5 Id. at 927, 83 L.R.R.M. at 2745. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970). 
6 420 U.S. at 70. See, e.g., Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 1~2, 199 (1944)., 
7 420 U.S. at 64. · 
8 Act of September 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. 
9 420 U.S. at 64. 
10 /d., citing Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289 (1964). 
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§8.4. Employees' Right to Union Representation During an In-
vestigatory Interview. In NLRB v.]. Weingarten, Inc., 1 a majority of 
the Supreme Court upheld the position of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board that it is a violation of section S(a)(l) of the National 
Labor Relations Act2 for an employer to deny an employee's requ~st 
that a union representative be present at an investigatory interview 
which the employee reasonably fears might result in disciplinary 
action.3 In the companion case of ILGWU v. Quality Mfg. Co., 4 the 
Court ruled that an employer also violated section S(a)(l) of the Act 
by disciplining an employee who refused to accede to the employer's 
demand that an investigatory interview be conducted in the absence 
of a union representative and by' disciplining union agents who sought 
to furnish requested representation.5 
In Weingarten, an employee who was being interrogated by a rep-
resentative of the employer about reported thefts asked for but was 
denied the presence of a union representative at the interrogation. 
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board claim-
ing that the employer's denial of union representation interfered with 
the employee's rights under section 7 of the Act6 and, therefore, vio-
lated section 8(a)(l). 7 In accordance with its decision in Mobil Oil 
Corp., 8 the Board held that the employer had violated the Act.9 The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, refused to enforce 
the Board's order. 10 
Mr. Justice Brennan, the spokesman for the majority, concluded 
that, notwithstanding previous conflicting Board precedent, 11 the 
Board had properly fulfilled its "responsibility to adapt the Act to 
changing patterns of industrial life" in developing· a section 7 right to 
representation at an investigatory interview. 12 In the Court's view, 
such a construction of the Act was within the literal language of sec-
tion 7 protecting "concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or 
protection."13 The Weingarten right of representation was also consis-
tent with the Act's fundamental purpose of eliminating inequality in 
bargaining power between employer. and employee.14 
§8.4. 1 420 u.s. 251 (1975). 
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce" employees in the exercise of the rights 
guaranteed in section 7 of the Act. 
3 420 U.S. at 266-67. 
4 420 u.s. 276 (1975). 
5 Id. at 281. 
6 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1970). 
7 I d. § 158(a)( 1). 
8 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1972). 
9 See 202 N.L.R.B. 446, 82 L.R.R.M. 1559,(197;1). 
10 485 F.2d 1135, 1138, 84 L.R.R.M. 2436, 2439 (5th Cir. 1973). 
11 See, e.g., Dobbs Houses, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 1565, 55 L.R.R.M. 1218 (1964). 
12 420 U.S. at 266-67. 
13 I d. at 265. 
14 ld. at 262. 
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The right of representation, as developed by the Bqard, exists only 
where the employee reasonably believes the investigation will result in 
disciplinary action.15 In addition, the employee must! specifically re-
quest the presence of a union representative. 16 Mmteover, the em-
ployer has no duty to bargain with the union repre~entative, 17 and 
may conduct his investigation without the employee's! participation if 
he wishes to avoid the steward's presence.18 : 
§8.5. Recognition on the Basis of Authorization Cards. In Lin-
den Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 1 the Court was con-
fronted with the question whether an employer violatds section 8(a)(5) 
of the National Labor Relations Act2 by refusing to !accept any evi-
dence of a union's majority status other than the rd1ults of a secret 
ballot representation election conducted by the Board. : 
In Linden Lumber, the union obtained authorizatim\l. cards from a 
majority of the company's employees and demanded tpat it be recog-
nized by the company as the collective bargaining r~presentative of 
those employees.3 After the company refused several times to bargain, 
the union filed unfair labor practice charges with the Bioard.4 
The Board held that the company had not violate~ section 8(a)(5) 
of the Act solely on the basis "of its refusal to accept evidence of ma-
jority status other than the results of a Board election.':5 The Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversec(.6 In a five-to-
four decision, the Supreme Court sustained the holding of the 
Board.7 ! 
Essential to an understanding of the Court's deqsion in Linden 
Lumber is a brief review of previous Board and court qecisions on the 
subject of authorization cards. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 8 a 
unanimous Court stated that: 
i [A]lmost from the inception of the Act . . . it was re¢ognized that 
a union did not have to be certified as the winner of ~ Board elec-
tion to invoke a bargaining obligation; it could esta~lish majority 
15 /d. at 257. 
l6Jd. 
17 /d. at 259. 
18 /d. at 258-59, quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052, 80 L.R.R.M. 1188, 1191 
(1972). 
§8.5. 1 419 U.S. 301 (1974). NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union Local 413, 487 F.2d 
1099, 84 L.R.R.M. 2177 (D.C. Cir. 1973), was decided together with f.indm Lumber. /d. 
2 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, sub-
ject to the provisions of Section 9(a)." 
I 
3 419 U.S. at 302. 
4Jd. 
5 Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 
1309 (1971). 
190 N.L.R.B. 718, 721, t7 L.R.R.M. 1305, 
6 487 F.2d 1099, 84 L.R.R.M. 2177 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
7 419 U.S. at 310. 
8 395 u.s. 575 (1969). 
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status by other means under the unfair labor practice provision of 
§ 8(a)(5)-by showing convincing support, for instance, by a 
union-called strike or by strike vote, or, as here, by possession of 
cards signed by a majority of the employees authorizing the union 
to represent them for collective bargaining purposes. 9 
However, the holding in Gissel was limited to sustaining a Board order 
that an employer, who interfered with a fair election, thereby causing 
the union's majority to erode, bargain with a union which had pre-
sented authorization cards as evidence of majority strength. 10 The 
Court specifically reserved judgment on the question whether an em-
ployer, who did not commit unfair labor practices undermining the 
union's strength or interfering with the Board's election machinery, 
could lawfully refuse to recognize a union that unquestionably had 
the support of a majority of the employer's employees.U 
At the time of the Gissel decision, it was the Board's view that an 
employer did not engage in an unfair labor practice by refusing to 
recognize a union when it had independent knowledge of the union's 
majority status. 12 The Board subsequently concluded, in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in Gissel, that an employer's refusal to rec-
ognize a union presenting valid authorization cards from a majority of 
the employees and st~ging a recognitional strike did constitute an 
illegal refusal to bargain under section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 13 However, 
in another reversal of position, the Board rejected its "independent 
knowledge" test as too subjective and unworkable. It held, instead, 
that absent independent unfair labor practices, or a voluntary agree-
ment between the union and the employer, an employer confronted 
with a demand for recognition is not required to recognize the union 
or file an election petition. 14 
In the opinion written by Mr. Justice Douglas, a bare majority of 
the Court adopted the Board's reasoning in Linden Lumber, holding 
that: 
[U]nless an employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice that 
impairs the electoral process, a union with authorization cards 
purporting to represent a majority of the employees, which is re-
fused recognition, has the burden of taking the next step in in-
voking the Board's election procedure. 15 
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices 
White, Marshall and Powell, concluded that the language and legisla-
tive history of the Act clearly indicate that Congress intended to im-
9 /d. at 596-97 (citations omitted). 
10 Id. at 614. 
11 /d. at 601 n.l8. 
12 Wilder Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 214,69 L.R.R.M. 1322, 1323 (1968). 
13 Wilder Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 175, 176, 75 L.R.R.M. 1023, 1024 (1970). 
14 Wilder Mfg. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039, 1041 (1972). 
15 419 U.S. at 310. 
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pose upon an employer the duty to bargain with a union that has pre-
sented convincing evidence of majority support, and that the em-
ployer should not be allowed to force the union to file • an election pe-
tition with the Board in instances where the union's majority support 
is apparent. 16 
B. MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§8.6. Power of Labor Relations Commission to Order Binding 
Arbitration. In Bennett v. Macmillan, 1 the Massachusetts Department 
of Public Welfare, pursuant to section 9A(b) of chapter 150E of the 
General Laws, had complained to the Labor Relations Commission 
that the social workers at the Department were engaged in a strike in 
violation of section 9A(a). 2 The Commission subsequently found that 
the employees were engaged in a strike and issued an order that they 
cease and desist from such activity. The Commission also ordered, inter 
alia, that the Department of Public Welfare and the bargaining rep-
resentative of the social workers promptly submit to binding arbitra-
tion of the dispute that had caused the strike.3 The Department 
brought an action in superior court to enforce th~ Commission's 
order insofar as it required the social workers to cease !and desist from 
their strike, but argued that the portion of the order that mandated 
binding arbitration was beyond the power of the Gommission and 
therefore should not be enforced. 4 The union argued that the 
Commission's power under section 9A(b) to "set requirements" upon 
finding a strike underway included the authority to order the parties 
to submit to binding arbitration.5 
The superior court found that the social workers and their union 
were engaged in an illegal strike in violation of section 9A and accord-
ingly ordered them to abide by the Commission's order to cease and 
16 I d. at 311-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
§8.6. 1 I M.L.C. 1370 (1975), affd sub nom. Director of the Division of Employee Re-
lations v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1045. 
2 G.L. c. 150E, § 9A provides: 
(a) No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and 
no public employee or employee organization shall induce, encourage or condone 
any strike, work stoppage, slowdown or withholding of services by such public em-
ployees. 
(b) Whenever a strike occurs or is about to occur, the employer shall petition the 
commission to make an investigation. If, after investigation, the commission de-
termines that any provision of paragraph (a) of this section has been or is about to 
be violated, it shall immediately set requirements that must be ~omplied with, in-
cluding, but not limited to, instituting appropriate proceedingis in the superior 
court for the county wherein such violation has occurred or is about to occur for 
enforcement of such requirements. 
3 1 M.L.C. at 1371. 
4 Id. at 1371, 1374. 
5 Id. at 1375. 
9
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desist from this illegal action. 6 However, the court concluded that the 
Commission was without power to order the parties to submit to bind-
ing arbitration. 7 
The court's holding that the Commission lacked the power to order 
binding arbitration was based on a reading of section 9A(b) in con-
junction with section 8 of chapter 150E. Section 8 provides that the 
parties to a collective-bargaining agreement may include in the 
agreement a grievance procedure culminating in final and binding 
arbitration to resolve any dispute concerning the meaning of their 
bargaining agreement. In the absence of such a provision for binding 
arbitration in the parties' written agreement, binding arbitration may 
be ordered by the Commission "upon the request of either party."8 In 
Bennett, the parties' collective-bargaining agreement apparently did 
not contain a provision requiring binding arbitration. 9 Since neither 
party requested the Commission to make such an order, the court 
concluded that the Commission lacked the power to order such arbi-
tration under section 8. 10 
The superior court dismissed the union's argument that the power 
of the Commission under section 9A(b) to "set requirements" 
whenever a strike occurs includes the power to order binding 
arbitration.'' The court's decision in this regard would seem to be 
correct. Since section 9A deals exclusively with the Commission's 
power to curtail an illegal walkout by union members, it would appear 
that the authority to "set requirements" relates exclusively to the set-
ting of requirements for compliance by the union, not the public em-
ployer. 
Furthermore, the provisions of chapter 150E negate any inference 
that section 9A(b) impliedly authorizes binding arbitration. Chapter 
150E specifically requires the parties to submit a dispute to binding 
arbitration in four instances: (1) where the parties have included such 
a requirement in a written collective-bargaining agreement; 12 (2) 
where the parties have not provided for arbitration in a collective-
6 !d. 
7 /d. at 1374-75. 
8 G.L. c. 150E, § 8. The refusal of either party to participate in good faith in such ar-
bitration is a prohibited practice under G.L. c. 150E, §§ 10(a)(6), 10(b)(3). 
9 The decision of the superior court is ambiguous on this question. See 1 M.L.C. at 
1374, where it is indicated that the parties' agreement contained a written grievance 
procedure but did not provide for binding arbitration. Paragraph 2 of the 
Commission's order, however, implies that the agreement provided for binding arbitra-
tion. /d. at 1371. 
Even if the parties' agreement did provide for binding arbitration, the Commission's 
order for binding arbitration would still seem to be improper since the_ court's decision 
indicates that the Department was willing to participate in binding arbitratiOn. 1 M.L.C. 
at 1374. Also, it does not appear that any complaint was made under § 10 cf ,-. 150E 
that either party had refuserl to participate in good faith in arbitration. 
10 1 M.L.C. at 1374. 
11 /d. at 1375. 
12 G.L. c. 150E, § 8. 
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bargaining agreement but one party nevertheless invokes 
arbitration; 13 (3) where the parties agree to have an impasse in collec-
tive bargaining so resolved; 14 and, (4) in the case of an impasse in 
negotiations involving police officers or firefighters persisting for 
more than 30 days after the publication of the factfin4er's report pur-
suant to section 9. 15 Thus, the General Laws are vety specific as to 
when binding arbitration is required. Accordingly, i( does not seem 
reasonable to read the power granted the Commissiqn under section 
9A(a) to "set requirements" to include the power td order a public 
employer to binding arbitration. 
Finally, policy reasons militate in favor of the court's construction of 
section 9A(b). If the Labor Relations Commission could order binding 
arbitration, a union could, in certain situations, obtain through an il-
legal strike a benefit to which it would not otherwise be entitled.16 
§8.7. Authority of an Arbitrator. In School Committee of Hanover 
v. Curry, 1 the Appeals Court held that the decision of a school com-
mittee to abolish a position is a matter within the excl1flsive managerial 
prerogatives of the school committee.2 An arbitrator ~herefore has no 
power to determine whether the school committe~'s decision was 
proper under a collective bargaining agreement. 3 
The Hanover School Committee and the Teachers Association were 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement that provided that dis-
putes involving the meaning or application of the agreement would be 
submitted to binding arbitration. During the term of this agreement, 
the School Committee abolished the position of supervisor of music. 
This decision was grieved by the teachers and ultimately was heard by 
an arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled that the School CoJ!llmittee had vio-
lated the parties' agreement by abolishing the positi0n, and ordered 
the Committee to reinstate the employee teacher's former position 
with back pay. 4 
Reviewing the arbitrator's award, the Appeals Cou11t stated that the 
critical inquiry in the case was whether, in light of ~he management 
rights5 vested in a school committee by section 3 7 of chapter 71 of the 
13 /d. 
14 /d. § 9. 
15 /d. § 9 note (originally enacted as Acts of 1973, c. 1078, § 4). 
16 For example, during the Survey year, teachers in Lynn (SI-13), New Bedford 
(SI-18), and Boston (SI-17) struck in violation of G.L. c. 150E, § 9A. In all three cases, 
the Commission, notwithstanding the Bennett decision and their apparent lack of statu-
tory authority, ordered the parties to submit all unresolved issues to binding arbitration. 
§8.7. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 467, 325 N.E.2d 282 (1975), aff'd, 1976 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 396, 343 N.E.2d 144. ' 
2 /d. at 479, 325 N.E.2d at 287. 
3 !d. at 481, 325 N.E.2d at 287. 
4 /d. at 468, 325 N.E.2d at 283-84. 
5 G.L. c. 71, § 37 provides in part that a school committee "shall have general charge 
of all the public schools .... " 
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General Laws, the arbitrator was correct in finding that the School 
Committee's unilateral elimination of the position of supervisor of 
music violated the governing collective-bargaining agreement. 6 In the 
event of a conflict, the court noted that the provisions of chapter 71 
would prevail over the negotiated agreement. 7 
The court pointed out that since the determination to be made in 
the instant case involved an interpretation of law rather than of con-
tract language, the arbitrator possessed no special expertise. 8 In ac-
commodating the "management prerogatives" provisions of section 37 
of chapter 71 with the collective-bargaining rights granted by Chapter 
149, the court held that "the question of the abolition of the position 
of supervisor of music was not within the scope of collective bargain-
ing because it was committed to the exclusive, nondelegable decision 
of the school committee by G.L. c. 71, § 37 .... "9 Accordingly, the 
court concluded, the teachers' grievance was not arbitrable and the 
arbitrator's award was a nullity. 10 
C. LABOR RELATIONs CoMMISSION DECISIONs 
§8.8. Managerial Employees. Chapter 150E of the General Laws 
gives collective bargaining rights to all public employees of the Com-
monwealth and its political subdivisions except members of the militia 
or national guard, employees of the Massachusetts Labor Relations 
Commission, elected or appointed officials, members of any board or 
commission, representatives of the public employer, including the 
administrative officer, director or chief of any department or agency 
of the Commonwealth or any political subdivision, and other mana-
gerial or confidential employee. 1 During the Survey year, the Mas-
sachusetts Labor Relations Commission in Town of Wellesley School 
6 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 471-72, 325 N.E.2d at 284-85. 
7 Id. at 473, 325 N.E.2d at 285. At the time the proceedings in this case began the col-
lective bargaining rights of teachers were governed by G.L. c. 149, § 178G et seq. Section 
1781 of this chapter provided: "In the event that any part or provision of any such 
[collective bargaining] agreement is in conflict with any law, ordinance or by-law, such 
law, ordinance or by-law shall prevail so long as such conflict remains .... " 
These provisions were superseded by G.L. c. 150E on July 1, 1974. G.L. c. 150E, § 7 
provides that a collective bargaining agreement shall prevail where it is in conflict with 
certain enumerated statutes, by-laws and regulations. This section, however, makes no 
reference to G.L. c. 71, § 37, which the court in Curry found to vest nondelegable man-
agerial rights in school committees. In fact, the Supreme Judicial Court has subse-
quently interpreted c. 150E as effecting no change in the rule of the Curry case. School 
Committee of Braintree v. Raymond, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 399, 402, 343 N.E.2d 145. 
8 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 475-76, 325 N.E.2d at 286, citing United 
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 
(1960). 
9 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 480-81, 325 N.E.2d at 287. 
10 Id. at 481, 325 N.E.2d at 287. 
§8.8. 1 G.L. c. 150E, §§ 1, 3. 
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Committee2 greatly limited the scope of the "managerial" and "confi-
dential" exclusion from the collective bargaining rights granted by 
Chaper 150E. 
The Wellesley School Committee and the Wellesley Teachers As-
sociation had bargained for a number of years concerning a unit of 
school administrators that included principals, assistant principals, di-
rectors, coordinators, and department heads. Such bargaining was 
clearly required by section 1781 of chapter 149 of the General Laws.3 
That statute, however, was superseded by chapter l50E on July 1, 
1974. Thereafter, the School Committee refused to continue bargain-
ing with the Teachers Association, claiming that all of the adminis-
trators in the unit were "managerial" and "confidential" employees 
and thus had no bargaining rights under chapter 150E. The School 
Committee petitioned the Commission to have the administrators so 
designated, and the Teachers Association filed charges alleging that 
the refusal of the School Committee to bargain was a prohibited prac-
tice in violation of sections 10(a)(1) and (5) of chapter 150£.4 
Chapter 150E establishes a three-part test to determine whether an 
individual is a "managerial" employee: 
if they (a) participate to a substantial degree in forn)mlating or de-
termining policy, or (b) assist to a substantial degree in the prep-
aration for or the conduct of collective bargaining on behalf of a 
public employer, or (c) have a substantial responsibility involving 
the exercise of independent judgment of an appellate responsibil-
ity not initially in effect in the administration of a collective bar-
gaining agreement or in personnel administration. 5 
Since this test is worded in the disjunctive, if an employee meets only 
one of the three statutory criteria, he must be excluded. 
In its opinion, the Commission, relying on what is at best ambigu-
ous legislative history, gave an extremely narrow construction to the 
terms of the managerial exclusion and concluded th<j.t the principals, 
assistant principals, department heads, coordinators and directors in 
the Wellesley Public Schools were not managerial employees. 6 The 
Commission initially addressed the question whether chapter 150E's 
2 1 M.L.C. 1389 (1975). 
3 G.L. c. 149, §§ 178G and 178H, gave collective bargaining rights to employees of 
any county, city, town, or district, except "elected officials, board and commission mem-
bers, and the executive officers of any municipal employer." Sec~ion 1781 of chapter 
149 required municipal employers to bargain collectively. See gerierally, Sherry, Labor 
Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv.-MASS. LAW §2.12, at 24-31. Thus, under ch~pter 149, all school 
administrators except the superintendent of schools and any assi~tant superintendent 
and confidential employees were deemed to have collective bargain"ng rights. 
4 G.L. c. 150E, § 10 provides: "(a) It shall be a prohibited prac ice for a public em-
ployer ... to: (l) Interfere, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise of any right 
guaranteed under this chapter; ... (5) Refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with 
the exclusive representative as required in section six .... " 
5 G.L. c. 150E, § l. 
6 1 M.L.C. at 1397-1406. 
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specific exclusion of persons "formulating or determining policy" as 
managerial employees applied to the Wellesley administrators. The 
Commission noted that there is no easy test to apply in determining 
whether an employee is a policy maker. 7 Nonetheless, relying on sev-
eral decisions of the New York Public Employee Relations Board,8 the 
Commission concluded that an employee's participation in policy for-
mulations must be of "m<tior importance when examined in light of 
the obj~ctive of the public enterprise" and "must impact a significant 
part of the public enterprise."9 The Commission also concluded that 
an advisory role in policy formulations is not sufficient. Therefore, it 
appears that in order to be excluded under this test, the employee 
must also play an active part in the deliberations on whether policy 
changes should be made. 10 
In applying this test to the Wellesley administrators, the Commis-
sion held that none of them met the statutory test because the Welles-
ley School Committee had the legal authority to act as a decision-
maker on all important matters, and the subject administrators did 
not participate in the Committee's deliberations on a regular basis.U 
The Commission next considered whether the administrators were 
excluded by the second part of the managerial test. The Commission 
had little difficulty in concluding that the administrators in the Welles-
ley Public Schools did not assist the School Committee to a substantial 
degree in the preparation for or the conduct of collective bargaining 
since they did not prepare any contract proposals, determine bargain-
ing objectives or strategy, or have a voice in the settlement of 
collective-bargaining negotiatioJ1. 12 With respect to the School 
Committee's conclusion that but for the bargaining rights of the ad-
ministrators under the prior law, their participation in collective bar-
gaining would have been more substantial, the Commission held that 
it could not accept that argument since "the Commission must ex-
amine what their duties are, not what they might have been."13 The 
Commission also implied that it might not exclude any of these ad-
ministrators in the future should the School Committee call on them 
to assist in collective bargaining. 
We need only observe that the system has functioned well despite 
the possession of organizational rights by supervisory personnel 
for a number of years, and has an excellent reputation for provid-
ing quality education. Speculation as to the status of employees 
under a set of facts which does not now obtain is not sufficient 
7 I M.L.C. at I403. 
8 See, e.g., Board of Education, School Dist. No. I, 5 P.E.R.B. 4040 (1972); Board of 
Education, Beacon Enlarged City School Dist., 4 P.E.R.B. 4344 (l97I). 
9 I M.L.C. at I403. 
10 !d. at I403-04. 
11 /d. at I403-05. 
12 Id. at I406-07. 
13 Id. at 1407. 
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reason to deprive such employees of existing rights~ Evidence on 
the record leads us to the conclusion that there is I)o irreconcila-
ble conflict between the exercise of bargaining righ~s by supervis-
ory personnel in a separate unit, and their esseqtial duties as 
supervisors, or their loyalty to the school system. 14 
With respect to the School Committee's contention t~at the adminis-
trators were excluded under the third part of the managerial test in 
that they had a substantial responsibility involving the' "exercise of in-
dependent judgment of an appellate responsibility nqt initially in ef-
fect, in the administration of a collective bargaining ~greement or in 
personnel administration," the Commission conclud~d that the ad-
ministrators did not have substantial personnel or labor management 
functions. 15 In reaching this conclusion, the Commisision noted that 
because of the statutory requirement of independence and substantial-
ity, the individual must have the authority to resolve important griev-
ances of subordinates independent of higher autho:rity. 16 Also, be-
cause this responsibility must be appellate in nature, the individual in 
order to be excluded under this test must be reviewing the decision of 
a lower-level supervisor. 17 . 
The Commission also rejected the School Committee's contention 
that the administrators should be precluded from bargaining on the 
basis that they are confidential employees. The basis for this conclu-
sion is not clear. The Commission initially noted that because the def-
inition of a confidential employee under chapter 150:¢18 is considera-
bly broader than that applied by the National labor Relations 
Board,19 it would not follow the decisions of the Bo~rd on that sub-
ject. However, the Commission then ruled that none 
1
of the adminis-
trators could be excluded as confidential because they "are not privy 
to confidential materials concerning negotiations, sal'!lries, or similar 
matters."20 Thus, after finding that the definition of ;the term confi-
dential was broader under chapter 150E than under the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Commission appears to have found that the 
Wellesley administrators were not confidential on the basis of a test at 
14 Id. at 1407-08. 
15 /d. at 1408-09. 
16 /d. at 1408. 
17 /d. at 1408-09. 
18 G.L. c. 150E, § 1 provides that "[e]mployees shall be designated as confidential 
employees only if they directly assist and act in a confidential cap;tcity to a person or 
persons otherwise excluded from coverage under this chapter." 
19 The National Labor Relations Act does not specifically define qr exclude confiden-
tial employees from the coverage of the Act. However, the Board
1 
has consistently ex-
cluded from bargaining units any employees who assist and act in * confidential capac-
ity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate managellnent policies in the 
field of labor relations. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich, 115 N.L.R.B. 72~. 724, 37 L.R.R.M. 
1383, 1384 (1956). i 
20 1 M.L.C. at 1410. ' 
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least as narrow as that applied by the National Labor Relations 
Board.21 
The decision of the Labor Relations Commission in the Wellesley 
case clearly implies that very few employees will be classified as mana-
gerial or confidential employees. Aside from the Wellesley School 
Committee, the only managerial employees in the Wellesley Public 
Schools are the superintendent of schools and four assistant 
superintendents. 22 Thus, notwithstanding the apparently broader ex-
clusionary language of chapter 150E, the Commission concluded, in 
effect, that only those administrators that had been excluded under 
sections 178G and 178H of chapter 149 would be excluded under 
chapter 150E.23 
§8.9. Bargaining Unit Determinations. In City of Chicopee School 
Committee, 1 the Chicopee Federation of Teachers petitioned the Labor 
Relations Commission to be certified as the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative in a unit including classroom teachers and excluding 
supervisory and administrative personnel. The Chicopee Educators 
Association, the bargaining representative of all of these employees, 
intervened, contending that the existing unit was appropriate, and 
that no election should be held in the petitioned-for unit. 
The Commission initially noted that it had not established a general 
rule that supervisory and administrative employees should not be in-
cluded in the same bargaining unit. 2 Rather, the Commission decided 
such bargaining unit questions on a case-by-case basis. The Commis-
sion then noted that, in the case of professional school employees, it 
had generally found it preferable to create two units, separating ad-
ministrative employees from the classroom teachers they supervise.3 
Accordingly, the Commission held that "the structure appropriate for 
the purposes of collective bargaining in the Chicopee School System 
consists of two units, one Administrative, the other including person-
nel whose duties are primarily instructional."4 
In view of the Chicopee decision, it appears that the Labor Relations 
Commission will, except in small school systems,5 place school ad-
ministrators in a separate bargaining unit from the teaching personnel 
they supervise. 6 
21 See, e.g., National Cash Register, 168 N.L.R.B. 910, 912-13, 67 L.R.R.M. 1041, 
1045 (1967). 
22 1 M.L.C. at 1392. 
23 See note 3 supra. 
§8.9. 1 1 M.L.C. 1195 (1974). 
2 Id. at 1196. 
3 Jd. at 1197. 
4 Id. at 1198. 
5 See, e.g., Nahant School Comm., MCR-682 (1971). 
6 See also Town of Wellesley School Comm., 1 M.L.C. 1389, 1407-08 (1975), discussed 
in ~8.8 supra, where the Commission implied that there is an irreconcilable conflict if 
supervisory school employees are included in the same unit as the employees they 
supervise. 
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§8.10. Subjects of Bargaining. In Groton School Committee, 1 the 
Labor Relations Commission found that a school committee is not re-
quired to bargain with the collective-bargaining representative of its 
teachers concerning school curriculum and teaching technology. In 
concluding that such matters were not mandatory su~j~cts of bargain-
ing under the General Laws,2 the Commission noted tbat nonmanda-
tory subjects of bargaining are defined as those that lie at the core of 
entrepreneurial control and are thus fundamental to the basic direc-
tion of an enterprise.3 
In applying this test to the facts presented, the Commission held 
that: 
Sound public policy requires that curriculum determination be a 
function primarily of the community and its representatives. State 
and municipal representatives are attuned to the demands of the 
public, while the [bargaining representative of the teachers] is at-
tuned primarily to the interests of its membership, which may or 
may not coincide with that of the general public. It! has been ob-
served that decisions dealing with what is to be ta~ght in public 
schools should be made by indjviduals who are responsible to the 
citizenry of the local community . . . and that course curriculum 
and textbook choice ought to be primarily determined by officials 
who are sensitive to the impact which the social makeup of a 
community has on its educational needs.4 
The Commission did, however, note that when a curriculum deci-
sion can be shown to have an impact on any mandatory subject of 
bargaining, then an employer will be under a duty to bargain over the 
effects of its decision with the employees' bargaining rtjpresentative. 5 
§8.10. I 1 M.L.C. 1221 (1974). 
2 See G.L. c. 150E, § 6, which superseded G.L. c. 149, § 178!. Bo~h of these statutes 
required a school committee to bargain in good faith concerning wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment. 
3 1 M.L.C. at 1222, citing Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 
(1964). 
4 1 M.L.C. at 1223. 
5 !d. at 1224. 
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